27/7/97

Mortal dilemmas

Physicians used to work under the banner ג€œSave the patient at all costs.ג€ Now it's more like ג€œSave the patient? At what cost?ג€
   
As fast as medical science advances, its parallel Pandora's box advances even faster. Once, a dying person died and that was that. With the advent of techno-wizardry, a dying person didn't die until every magical gizmo had its turn delaying the inevitable interminably. Which brings us to today's philosophy on dying: you call that living?
   
Welcome to the dicey field of medical ethics. ג€œIt used to be a paternalistic relationship -- that is, physician to patient. Now it's autonomous, but it went too far,ג€ says Prof. Avraham Steinberg, a medical ethicist who teaches the subject. Steinberg, on staff at Jerusalem's Shaare Zedek Hospital, sits on a national ethics committee that makes agonizing decisions on -- in the extreme -- who shall live and who shall die.
   
He believes the Patient's Rights Law, which is based on a US model, is a mistake. ג€œThe law isn't wide-ranging enough. We're left with ethics but not law. It leaves too much decision-making to people; it's too risky. But on the other hand, in medicine it is important to have a degree of flexibility.ג€
   
Not surprisingly, even in the matter of dealing with dilemmas, there are dilemmas. Steinberg found it difficult to speak uninterrupted about the subject because his phone kept ringing. ג€œAnother agonizing decision,ג€ he explained after the umpteenth call. ג€œA baby, born perfectly healthy. The mother nursed for the first time, then put him in the crib, waiting for someone to return him to the nursery. When a nurse finally came, the baby was completely blue. He was unconscious for about seven minutes. Now, a week later, he doesn't react, doesn't breathe on his own; he has good heart function and good blood pressure, so according to the standard criteria, this baby is alive but non-functioning.
   
ג€œThe dilemma is, how certain are we that this baby is doomed to a vegetative state? Or will it recover to some extent but still be very disabled? Or, who knows, maybe it'll recover fully. Should we continue treating this baby and possibly leave the parents to care for a baby with no function? Or should we stop treatment and let it die?
   
ג€œThe question is, who's to judge? The parents? The doctor? Society? The courts? The ethics committee?ג€
   
The decision here will have to be paternalistic because the only one who can't decide is the baby itself.
   
ג€œIt's a question of value of life versus quality of life. Once you start saying that certain types of life have no value, you are venturing on to a slippery slope. What quality of life is not worth living? Where do you draw the line? Is it fair for the child to die because the parents cannot bear the burden?ג€
   
The nature of this field is that for every thousand questions asked, there may -- or may not -- be one answer. ג€œThis brings us to the slippery slope: tomorrow comes a similar baby who's not completely vegetative: he has a bit of an IQ, he screams a little, there is some eye contact. Will you preserve this one? If you go to extremes, it's much easier. Either you say, 'I don't care what kind of life, I give everyone the best treatment possible and that's it.' Or you say, 'Any quality of life I don't like, I don't preserve.' ג€
   
There are three end-of-life decisions a physician can take. ג€œOne: you have no right to judge any type of life, your obligation is to treat everyone, to do the best you can and never mind the consequences. Very few people hold this view. One person who did was Yeshayahu Leibowitz. He taught that you have no right to judge life because then you'll be Nazis because what did the Nazis do? They said this life is worth living, and this one isn't.
   
ג€œTwo: the other end of the scale is what's happening in Holland, where physicians kill patients by means of active euthanasia. They believe in preserving quality of life.
   
ג€œOption three: passive euthanasia, which is somewhere in between. It is what most people believe. You take into account quality of life, but you never kill a patient. This is, of course, where you find the toughest dilemmas.ג€
   
Not all medical-ethics quandaries are so pointedly life-and-death. There is the unending debate of resource allocation -- that is, with funding as limited as it is, what should be acquired or developed, at the expense of what else?
   
In Israel, the confluence of so many religious and ethnic ethics sometimes provides the committee with unusual challenges. It recently grappled with an interesting case involving Arabs' attitudes toward women. ג€œThere is a new law that states kidney donors do not have to be blood relatives -- but a committee has to agree. This presents another dilemma: people need organs, of which there's a shortage. But on the other hand, some people might be willing to donate them for the wrong reasons.
   
ג€œA village mukhtar needed a kidney. His blood relatives could not be donors for medical reasons. Someone who works for him, expressing appreciation to his 'master,' said he was willing to donate a kidney but when he was tested, he was found to be inappropriate. So the worker asked his siblings to be donors.
   
ג€œHis sister -- who is divorced with two children -- turned out to be suitable, so the family decided she should be the donor. The committee had to assume she was coerced into consenting. The surgery would have left her with a large visible scar on her abdomen and, combined with her status of divorcee with two children, she would never be able to remarry within the Arab community.
   
ג€œThe committee felt it would be unfair to her and decided that we should turn down her offer  -- though if one of her brothers had offered, we would have agreed. In this case, we put social considerations ahead of medical.ג€
   
It isn't easy playing God.